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1 Introduction and motivation
It is commonly agreed that microprudential banking regulations, Basel I and (even more
so) Basel II, amplify the impact of the economic cycle on balance sheets and make banks
more vulnerable to downturns. To reduce this procyclicality and to strengthen banking
stability, Basel III requires more capital and introduces countercyclical capital buffers.
More generally, banking recapitalization has been high on policymakers’ agenda despite
concerns about deleveraging and a potential credit crunch. Moreover, many scholars, most
notably Admati et al. (2010), have called for much higher capital ratios than required
even under Basel III, arguing that equity is not really costly.
Admati et al’s theoretical point goes as follows: existing models of capital adequacy
in banking and corporate finance emphasize the need for inside equity, i.e. equity brought
by those, such as managers and large monitors (venture capitalists, block shareholders),
who can destroy value and therefore must be given skin in the game. But the legal and
regulatory concepts of equity include outside equity, i.e., equity held by passive share-
holders who do not necessarily impact the corporate strategy. Admati et al’s reasoning
is that, while inside equity is, as is widely acknowledged, costly/ scarce, outside equity
is not. The cushion created by equity could be reinforced by adding, say, money market
funds as an extra line of defense to protect depositors. Put differently, while inside equity
is relevant, outside equity and debt obey the assumptions of Modigliani-Miller (1958)
and so the social cost of outside equity equals that of debt. Implications of this line
of reasoning for capital adequacy requirements are then unclear; indeed, existing capi-
tal adequacy requirements and current attempts at reinforcing bank capital cannot be
rationalized without addressing the very relevance of outside equity.
While its theoretical, uncalibrated nature precludes any judgment about the desirabil-
ity of Basel III reforms, this paper argues against the view that the social cost of substan-
tially heightened capital requirements are negligible. It extends Dewatripont-Tirole (1994
a, b)’s theory of outside capital structure to allow for the presence of macroeconomic
shocks. It investigates the consequences of such shocks for existing regulation and reform
proposals.
The theory is based on the idea that managerial incentives depend on how broader
corporate choices are affected by performance. Policies that validate managerial choices
following good performance, and constrain/downsize/liquidate after a bad one serve as
a powerful incentive for managerial compliance. While forward-looking profit maximiza-
tion implies that bygones are bygones and poor (good) performance remains unpunished
(unrewarded), shareholder control in good times and a shift in control from shareholders
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to debtholders after poor performance by contrast rewards (penalizes) managers for their
good (poor) performance. Thus the paradigm belongs to the family of models that view
debt as a disciplining device (Townsend 1979, Gale-Hellwig 1985, Aghion-Bolton 1992,
Hart-Moore 1994); like in this literature, debt can operate through downsizing or liquida-
tion after low profits. The implications of debt control are broader (including all actions
that are not aligned with managerial preferences). And especially, the model predicts a
role for outside equity, unlike the rest of the literature.
The desirability of toughening corporate policies after poor performance however ap-
plies only to that part of the performance that is under managerial control. From Holm-
ström (1979)’s insulation principle, the fate of economic agents should a priori not be
conditioned on events, such as macroeconomic shocks, that lie outside their control. In-
vestigating the consequences of this basic principle leads to the following conclusions:
• The Basel I and II policy of ignoring macroeconomic shocks in the determination of
capital adequacy requirements leads to too much intervention in recessions and too
much leniency in booms (the regulation rewards the "lucky dollar").
• Forbearance, a commonly adopted supervisory policy of de facto lowering capital
adequacy requirements during a recession (in conflict with Basel rules), does a bet-
ter job at insulating managers from macroeconomic shocks; but it creates sizable
incentives for gambling by then-undercapitalized banks.
• Optimal regulation requires that macroeconomic shocks be automatically neutral-
ized, so as to keep the incentives of the investor in control unchanged. This neutral-
ization can take the form of dynamic provisioning or a (Basel III) countercyclical
capital buffer provided self-insurance is feasible; if it is not, macro-hedging such as
capital insurance or CoCos can achieve this goal.
• General equilibrium properties of these alternative instruments are an important
topic for research.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 3
introduces macroeconomic shocks. Section 4 briefly discusses general equilibrium aspects
and section 5 concludes.
Finally, the existing literature on macroprudential regulation has a rather different
focus. Our paper focuses on how prudential regulation should deal with macro shocks,
not on other reasons that have been invoked as "externality-based" rationales for macro-
prudential regulation, such as interconnectedness (e.g., Allen-Gale 2000, Caballero-Simsek
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2010, Rochet-Tirole 1996), fire sales (e.g., Lorenzoni 2008), surveillance of asset bubbles,
or widespread maturity mismatches (e.g., Farhi-Tirole 2012).
2 A simple setting
In the spirit of the branch of the security design literature initiated by Aghion and Bolton
(1992), who argued that securities are characterized not only by income rights but also
by control rights, we analyzed in Dewatripont and Tirole (1994a) a managerial moral
hazard problem in which it is optimal to discipline the manager at least in part through
performance-contingent corporate choices.
We argued that, if the corporate actions meant to discipline the manager are not con-
tractible, and if, as is generally the case, optimal corporate choices are time-inconsistent,
investors in control of corporate choices must face an incentive that differs from firm-value
maximization, in order to be induced to take the ex-ante optimal action. This “double
moral hazard problem” in turn calls for the presence of at least a second group of outside
investors who receive the remainder of the revenue of the firm. This second group of
investors is similar to the "budget breaker" introduced by Holmström (1982) to address
moral hazard in teams.
Suppose that the action the manager prefers (call it C for "continuation") is riskier
than the action she likes less (call it L for "liquidation"); the efficient provision of man-
agerial incentives calls for allocating control to investors with a concave, i.e., "debt-like",
return after bad performance, and a convex, i.e., "equity-like", return after good perfor-
mance. This suggests that the second-best optimum can be implemented with standard
debt and (outside) equity, with contingent control: equity control after good performance,
and debt control after bad performance. The model thus predicts securities which consist
of realistic bundles of control and income rights.
This section describes the objective functions, the timing, the second-best optimal
performance-contingent action choice, and finally the latter’s implementation through an
appropriate debt-equity ratio.
2.1 Timing
As discussed above, the model involves both managerial and corporate choices. A banking
manager/entrepreneur has no financial resources to cover an investment cost, and turns
to investors for financing. The capital structure- that is, the allocation among investors of
contingent cash-flow and control rights- is designed at this financing stage. The manager
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then exerts either a high or low effort. This effort results in a good or bad short-term
performance. This short-term profit is verifiable, and so conditions the allocation of
control. After observing a signal about future prospects, the group of investors put in
control by the realization of the short-term profit then chooses a corporate action or
strategy; it can liquidate or more generally take a conservative policy (action L), continue
(action C), or gamble for resurrection (action G). Finally, the verifiable long-term profit
is realized.
Figure 1: Timing
More precisely, the timing, depicted in Figure 1, goes as follows:
1. Financing. The manager/entrepreneur raises an amount I for investment from out-
side investors. The capital structure concomitantly designed specifies the incentive
scheme of the investor in control at stage 4 below.
2. Moral hazard. Manager chooses unobservable effort a ∈ {a, a}. The high effort costs
her Ψ, the low effort costs her nothing. We assume the bank has a positive NPV
only if a is chosen.
3. Short-term profit realization. The verifiable short-term profit π ∈ {π, π} is realized.
A high effort increases the probability of a high short-term profit: Pr (π |a) = p > Pr
(π |a) = p. We assume that π < 0 < π. We interpret a negative profit as a shortfall
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of income to honor some liabilities to workers or suppliers, liabilities that are senior
to investor claims on the firm; such liabilities have to be paid at stage 4, either out
of liquidation proceeds, or by investors if they choose to avoid liquidation.
4. Exercise of corporate control. An unverifiable signal s ∈ [s, s] (with s < 1/2),
independent of π, is observed. After observing this signal, investors in control (as
specified at stage 1) select (unverifiable) action A ∈ {L,C,G}. Action L ("liquida-
tion") generates ℓ for sure. The other two actions generate a random "long-term
profit" later on, at stage 5.
5. Long-term profit realization. The long-term profit is verifiable and independent of
previous managerial effort. Its probability distribution thus depends only on the
choice of corporate strategy A:
• Action C ("continuation") generates 1 with probability s, α with probability s
and 0 with probability 1− 2s.
• ActionG ("gambling") generates 1 with probability s+τ and 0 with probability
1− s− τ.
We assume that ℓ + π > 0, so that, if at stage 3, π < 0 is realized, the liabilities it
represents can be repaid at stage 4 out of ℓ if action L is chosen. On the other hand,
an investor who wishes to choose another action has to first pay up −π since the other
actions may not deliver any income.
For expositional convenience, all players are risk-neutral and do not discount the fu-
ture. The problem is interesting only if it is optimal to induce the high managerial effort,
which we will posit. More importantly, we assume that monetary incentives do not per-
fectly align managerial and investor incentives; for simplicity, we capture this through an
assumption of extreme risk aversion: The manager does not respond at all to monetary
incentives; that is, she demands a given wage, normalized to 0, and does not enjoy money
beyond that level (as shown in Dewatripont-Tirole 1994a, the results extend to the case in
which the manager responds to monetary incentives, as long as the moral hazard problem
is inconsistent with the realization of the first best). By contrast, the manager cares about
the corporate action choice: She receives private benefit B unless the liquidation action L
is selected. We assume that B > Ψ/(p− p).
The manager’s utility function is therefore:
−Ψ1(a=a) + B1(A =L),
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where 1(.) denotes the indicator function.
For conciseness, we also assume that action C is not only the action preferred by the
manager, but also the ex-post efficient one. In particular, it yields a higher expected
long-term profit than action L even after the worst possible signal. In turn, we assume
that action L generates in expectation more long-term profit than action G, even for the
most favorable signal. These two assumptions can be concisely expressed by the following
condition:
s+ τ < ℓ < s(1+ α). (1)
The ex-post efficiency of action C combined with the managerial preference for that
action implies that it is always optimal to continue after a good short-term performance.
Continuation then both increases investor return and boosts managerial incentives.
Anticipating on our treatment, the rationale for introducing action G is to create
scope for asset substitution by shareholders in control of an undercapitalized bank. Asset
substitution will be a concern under a negative macroeconomic shock, and the presence
of action G will make forbearance undesirable.
The verifiability of profits gives value to equity as the "residual claim" (by contrast,
only "hard" claims have value in models with unverifiable profits). The non-verifiability
of the action choice introduces a second moral hazard problem to the model besides the
managerial effort choice, and therefore creates a need for endowing the investor in control
with an incentive scheme, so as to appropriately discipline the manager. Finally, adding
a continuous unverifiable signal s (which is defined so as to be higher, the higher the gain
of choosing action C over action L) will allow us to uniquely define the capital ratio which
implements the second-best managerial incentive scheme.
2.2 Managerial incentives
Ex-post profit maximization is inconsistent with the manager choosing a, which is costly
for her; for, ex-post profit maximization leads to a continuation rule ("always C") that
is independent of past profit and so to a managerial utility that does not respond to the
choice of effort.
We already noted that regardless of the value of s, continuation is optimal after the
high profit π: It maximizes the ex-post profit and it strengthens the incentive to choose
the high effort a. By contrast, inducing some liquidation after π is necessary to induce
the high effort a. The least-cost approach to inducing managerial effort is to liquidate
when the short-term profit is π and the expected long-term profit is low.1 Hence ignoring
1Strictly speaking, and because of our extreme assumption on managerial preferences, the man-
7
implementation issues (the topic of subsection 2.3), there should be liquidation after π,
iff s ≤ s∗ with s∗ defined by:
[1− (1− p)Pr(s ≤ s∗)]B−ψ = [1− (1− p)Pr(s ≤ s∗)]B
or:
(p− p)Pr(s ≤ s∗)B = ψ.
The objective to induce the high effort in the least-cost fashion thus uniquely defines the
threshold s∗.
Result 1: The optimal way to induce the manager to exert the high effort is to choose
action L after bad short-term performance whenever the unverifiable signal is lower than
s∗.
The higher the cost of effort ψ, or the lower the private benefit B, the higher the
threshold s∗, and thus the higher the probability Pr(s ≤ s∗) of liquidation after a low
short-term profit.
2.3 Allocation of control
We now show that standard securities, debt and equity, can be chosen so as to implement
the contingent policy described in subsection 2.2. We let D denote the face value of debt.
Debt is here a claim on the bank’s long-term profit; it is senior to the shareholders’ claim.
As we will show below, we can implement the second best with a moderate debt level, i.e.
D < α.
We first determine under which conditions shareholders choose action C when in con-
trol. First, note that they never pick action L for any (nonnegative) level of debt, since
this safest action is not ex-post efficient and furthermore debtholders are senior claimants
relative to shareholders. Neither do shareholders choose action G for an arbitrary signal
s, provided the level of debt is not too high, that is, provided that D satisfies:
(s+ τ)(1−D) ≤ s(1−D) + s(α−D),
ager/entrepreneur only aims at minimizing liquidation subject to obtaining financing from outside
investors. This least-cost (i.e. constrained-efficient) solution is only weakly optimal for the man-
ager/entrepreneur in general. However, with more general preferences (monetary responsiveness for
example), or with variable project size and size-dependent private benefits (B(I)), it would be strictly
optimal.
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or:
τ(1−D) ≤ s(α−D).
Call D+(s) the maximum level of debt such that this condition is satisfied:
D+(s) =
sα− τ
s− τ
. (2)
Note that the level D+(s) is positive (from (1)), rises with s and is strictly less than
α (and therefore less than 1); it approaches α as τ goes to 0.
Now that we have determined shareholders’ action choice conditional on profit, let us
consider the following capital-adequacy-requirement implementation mechanism: Share-
holders are in control provided they keep debt less than or equal to some D∗ to be defined
below; posit for now that D∗ is lower than D+(s∗) and bigger than the net proceeds from
liquidation ℓ+ π:
ℓ+ π < D∗ < D+(s∗). (3)
Otherwise, control shifts to debtholders who, we assume for now, choose action L.
Assume further that the bank has a level of (long-term) debt equal to D∗ at the initial
stage (we shall discuss this later).
If π = π > 0, at stage 3, shareholders have control and can distribute up to π as
dividend without increasing leverage, and they find it in their interest to distribute this
maximal amount. Indeed, shareholders do prefer to receive dividends whenever this does
have any impact on control allocation: Not maximally distributing dividends just raises
the value of the debt, without any impact on total surplus.
If instead π = π < 0, shareholders lose control unless they re-invest the absolute value
of π into the bank. They are willing to recapitalize provided that:
π+ s(1+ α− 2D∗) ≥ 0. (4)
Indeed, shareholders obtain nothing when control shifts to debtholders, provided they go
for liquidation. Alternatively, shareholders can recapitalize the bank (at the cost of the
absolute value of π) and implement action C, which gives them an expected revenue of
s(1−D∗) + s(α−D∗).2
Clearly, recapitalization is more attractive, the higher the signal s. One can define D∗
2This reasoning assumes that α ≥ D∗, because shareholders are meant to receive max {0, α−D∗}. But
we have already assumed that D∗ ≤ D+(s∗) (an assumption we discuss later on), which implies D∗ < α.
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such that:
π+ s∗(1+ α− 2D∗) = 0,
or:
D∗ =
s∗(1+ α) + π
2s∗
, (5)
and this implies that shareholders keep control if and only if s ≥ s∗.3
To ensure that our capital-adequacy-requirement mechanism implements the desired
actions, we finally have to check that debtholders find it preferable to liquidate instead
of paying −π to workers and suppliers and go for continuation whenever s ≤ s∗.4 This
requires:
ℓ ≥ 2s∗D∗ = s∗(1+ α) + π, (6)
an assumption which will be satisfied provided π is low enough.
Remark 1. Our various conditions require some assumptions on the possible values of π.
First, there is condition (6). Second, the above condition defining D∗ implies, together
with (3), that π should not be too low, or more precisely that:
ℓ+ π <
s∗(1+ α) + π
2s∗
. (7)
The third relevant technical condition relevant is that the prescribed debt levelD∗ does not
induce shareholders to pick action G when they are in control. This means D+(s) > D∗
for all s ≥ s∗. Since dD+/ds > 0, this requires D+(s∗) > D∗, or:
s∗α− τ
s∗ − τ
>
s∗(1+ α) + π
2s∗
. (8)
Once again, this will be satisfied provided π is low enough.
Taken together, conditions (6) to (8) require that π must satisfy:
ℓ+ π <
s∗(1+ α) + π
2s∗
< min

ℓ
2s∗
,
s∗α− τ
s∗ − τ

. (9)
Since s < 0.5, these conditions are not incompatible. We thus have the following result:
3Note that, for s = s∗, shareholders are indifferent between leaving control to debtholders and paying
−π in order to choose action C. Since we have assumed that D∗ < D+(s∗), this means that, when s = s∗,
they strictly prefer leaving control to debtholders to choosing action G. Since the payoff associated with
G is increasing in s, this also means shareholders will not be tempted to pay −π in order to choose action
G for any s < s∗.
4We do not need to consider action G, as debtholders always prefer C to G (from (s + τ)D∗ < 2sD∗
for all s and conditions (2) and (3)).
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Result 2: Assuming conditions (1) and (9), one can implement the performance-
contingent corporate action choice described in Result 1 through a cap on leverage de-
fined by D∗. This cap can alternatively be reinterpreted as a minimum capital requirement
(I − D∗)/I.5 Preventing shareholders from choosing the gambling action G requires that
D∗ < D+(s∗).
Recapitalization is less attractive, the higherD∗ is, which is a form of "debt overhang".
Moreover, when π is lower, so must D∗ be: otherwise, one will have excessive liquidation,
because shareholders will too often be unwilling to recapitalize the bank.
Remark 2. While contingent control and non-contingent securities can implement the
second-best optimum, so can non-contingent control and contingent securities. The model
only predicts (i) the performance sensitivity of the compensation of the investors in con-
trol, and (ii) the need for a second group of outside investors to "balance the books".
But, for the sake of realism, it makes sense to implement the second-best with standard
securities.
2.4 Discussion
Renegotiation. Would renegotiation among investors make the capital structure irrelevant
and thus bring us back to a Modigliani-Miller world? While properly allocated control
by an investor who does not maximize ex-post profit boosts managerial effort, once effort
has been chosen, it is in the community of investors’ interest to renegotiate away the
ex-post inefficiency. As discussed in Dewatripont and Tirole (1994a), for the Modigliani-
Miller irrelevance-of-financial-structure theorem not to apply, one needs either imperfect
renegotiation or the inability for the manager to avoid concessions and to fully free-ride
on the renegotiation process. For example, when faced with the prospect of liquidation,
the manager might be forced in the renegotiation process to give up some of her financial
compensation (in the more general version of this model, in which the manager responds to
monetary incentives) or to disclose some way of increasing profitability under continuation
at the detriment of her private benefits.
Rationale for regulation. As for the rationale for regulating banks, our book (Dewatripont
and Tirole, 1994b) argued that banks (and for similar reasons insurance companies, pen-
sion funds ...) differ from regular firms in that their debtholders, i.e. depositors, are
5Allowing π to be distributed, and requiring π to be ’neutralized’, maintains the capital ratio un-
changed, at least when we take a historical-cost-accounting approach. Such an approach makes sense
because the true value of the bank only varies as a function of the unverifiable signal s, for which there
is thus no market-based measurement.
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not able to exert control rights appropriately and need to be "represented". Disciplin-
ing managers appropriately then calls for a depositors’ representative. The exercise of
regulatory control is for example key to preventing banks in trouble from "gambling for
resurrection" by raising interest rates on deposits and attracting funds from depositors
who "count" on implicit or explicit support from the authorities (deposit insurance fund)
or from taxpayers.
Deposit insurance in this respect has a further benefit beyond its primary goal, the
prevention of bank runs (Diamond-Dybvig 1983). If coupled in bad times with control
rights allocated to either the deposit insurance fund or to the regulator entrusted with the
defence of depositors, deposit insurance provides the representative of passive depositors
with an incentive scheme. Under this view, the depositor representative’s mission is
to minimize losses borne by the insurance fund, or equivalently maximize the value of
deposits.
Lower leverage? Let us now return to the assumption that the manager/entrepreneur
chooses to start at stage 1 with debt level D∗, and not with a lower level, that is, leverage
is the maximum level compatible with the capital adequacy requirement. Actual regula-
tion indeed only sets a cap on leverage, and not a prescribed level. But in fact, setting D
below D∗ would compromise financing as this would reduce the probability of liquidation
after low short-term profit and therefore violate the manager’s incentive constraint (in
this sense, debt no longer acts as a managerial disciplining device). So, here, the man-
ager/entrepreneur is induced to choose a debt level no lower than D∗, even though we
have not introduced any tax advantage of debt or "bailout premium".
Risk weights and the Basel regulation regime. The above setting is an oversimplified
version of the Basel regulatory regime. In particular, it lacks risk weights (whether ex-
ogenously chosen — as in Basel I — or ratings- or internal-model-based — as in Basel II
and III). However, a simple reinterpretation of the model demonstrates the benefits of
risk weights. Introduce a stage-1 choice of investment that increases its riskiness, in that
π decreases and π increases (this is a mean-preserving spread if p π + (1 − p)π remains
constant). From (5), D∗ must decrease. That is, an increase in risk must result in a lower
allowed leverage ratio, which is exactly what risk weights on assets, as used since Basel I,
achieve.
In sum, our setting indicates that the "Basel philosophy", namely a (risk-based) cap
on leverage, is not incompatible with optimality. This assertion should however be ac-
companied by two caveats. First, it is of course only qualitative, since our setting does
not allow us to discuss the calibration of the Basel capital adequacy ratio. Second, our
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treatment so far has ignored macroeconomic shocks, which we now turn to.
3 Macroeconomic shocks
We now add a macroeconomic shock. Recall that Basel I and II do not make any distinc-
tion between micro- and macro-shocks: In the context of our model, this means that the
maximum leverage that shareholders have to satisfy is D∗, whether low short-term profits
are the result of poor individual performance or a negative macroeconomic shock. What
if we introduce a verifiable macroeconomic shock however? Assume for example that a
macro shock transforms short-term profit π into π + ε, where ε ∈ {ε,ε} can be positive
(boom) or negative (recession). By contrast, the random variable s remains idiosyncratic
(and nonverifiable). Then we can immediately say a number of useful things.
3.1 Basel I/II regulations do not treat optimally
macroeconomic shocks
Incentive theory tells us that "pure noise" should not enter an optimal incentive scheme
(Holmström, 1979) or, to cast it in terms of the above setting, that the probability of
liquidation should be Pr(s ≤ s∗) after poor individual performance π, regardless of the
value of ε.
This means that ignoring the distinction between an idiosyncratic and a macroeco-
nomic shock as Basel I or II do, namely asking shareholders to bring in the absolute value
of π + ε back into the bank if they want to keep control, is suboptimal: it will lead to
excessive liquidation in a recession, that is, action L chosen for some s’s higher than s∗,
and insufficient liquidation in a boom, that is, action C chosen for some s’s below s∗.6
Basel I/II regulations may also have another cost in terms of managerial incentives.
If the probability of a boom is large enough, continuation is more likely for profit π than
in the absence of macroeconomic shock and so the manager no longer has an incentive to
exert effort at stage 2: She then bets on the occurrence of a macroeconomic boom that
will in part compensate for her lack of effort.
The idea that one should add a "macroprudential" perspective to the "purely micro-
prudential" Basel I/II approach is by now well accepted (for a voice calling for such a
6The cutoff signal s∗(ε) in state ε is then given by
π+ ε+ s∗(ε)(1+ α− 2D∗) = 0
(provided that macroeconomic shocks are not too large).
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macroprudential approach before the 2007-8 financial crisis, see Borio, 2003). Note how-
ever that the idea is often cast more in terms of the dangers of "procyclicality", that is,
in terms of its impact on third parties — amplifying impact of deleveraging through fire
sales, domino effects, ... — than in terms of the incentives it implies for bank managers
and investors.
3.2 Forbearance is not optimal either
While an explicit macroprudential approach is a new concept in regulatory rules, macro-
economic shocks have not always been "ignored" in regulatory practice. In fact, "forbear-
ance" is a frequent response to banking crises caused by negative macroeconomic shocks.
For example, as has been widely documented (see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994b) for a
summary), in the US 1980’s Savings and Loans crisis, a reduction of the capital ratio as
well as regulatory accounting changes reduced the recapitalization requirements of S&L’s
(i.e. allowed a rise in leverage) when these institutions were hurt by a sharp rise in in-
terest rates and then by a recession. In terms of our setting, this amounts to allowing
shareholders to put only the absolute value of π back into the bank to keep control, rather
than the higher absolute value of π+ ε, namely to "ignore" the negative ε.7
Such forbearance is also suboptimal: While it partially protects the bank manager
against excessive liquidation (it does not do it fully, since the rise in leverage reduces
their incentive to recapitalize), it does alter shareholder incentives by allowing leverage to
increase in a recession. If debt goes beyond D+(s), shareholders choose action G, namely
gambling for resurrection. In fact, this practice was widespread in the S&L crisis.8
The point to stress here is that neither Basel I/II nor forbearance "remove noise" from
both the shareholders’ andmanagers’ incentive schemes. The next subsections investigate
various schemes that neutralize the impact of macroeconomic shocks on shareholders and
thereby maintain appropriate discipline on managers.
7This was also done to some extent in 2008, and one of the many purposes of Basel III is to eliminate
that by "focusing only on high-quality capital". Interestingly, there seems to be a pattern where existing
regulation is "twisted" after big recessions, which leads to a need for a new regulation.
8Gambling occurs whenever
1+ α− 2D+(s)
1+ α− 2D∗
>
π+ ε
π
.
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3.3 Transient macroeconomic shock: dynamic provisioning and
countercyclical capital buffers
Suppose first that the economy goes through a deterministic cycle of booms and reces-
sions; in order to rule out potentially complex multi-period incentive schemes, we assume
that managers live for only one period (where each period is made up of stages 1 through
5); the action L should here be viewed not as a liquidation, but as a conservative policy
that yields a safe payoff to the investors and no private benefit for the manager. More-
over, after having chosen action L, the debtholder representative will find a new set of
shareholders willing to invest at the start of the following period. Finally, by defining π
and π adequately, we can always assume that ε+ ε = 0.
In this extreme situation, the bank can self-insure and does not need to contract for
a macro hedge. In the spirit of the Spanish "dynamic provisioning" policy of the last
decade or Basel III’s countercyclical capital buffer, assume that when ε is realized, it has
to be "hoarded" so as to be "released" when ε is realized one period later: Assuming that
the interest rate on the safe store of value in the economy is 0, we can then get back to a
D∗ defined by:
π+ s∗(1+ α− 2D∗) = 0.
This scheme forces the bank to be better capitalized in booms and allows it to use
retained earnings accumulated during a boom to eliminate its need for recapitalization in
a recession. Dynamic provisioning and the countercyclical capital buffer however share
the usual drawbacks of self-insurance; for example, it cannot address the possibility of
i.i.d. shocks (there might be multiple negative shocks in a row), let alone the case of
permanent shocks. The requirement for a negative shock to be "transient" in the sense
adopted here is therefore strong; we here mean a certitude of a future offset.
3.4 Macro hedges: capital insurance and CoCos
The simplest way of keeping managerial and investor incentives unchanged in the presence
of macroeconomic shocks is to keep capital ratios constant and arrange automatic cash
inflows and outflows. That is, the bank may contract with a provider of insurance who
commits to bring cash in a recession and receive money from the bank in a boom.
This solution is straightforward, and admits several variants considered below. But it
raises difficult, general-equilibrium issues that we will only touch on in Section 4. Indeed
risk-shifting only displaces the problem: Given that the shock is by definition a macro
shock, who will bear it? How will the insurance provider cope with its own dual incentive
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problem? Clearly some economic agents must bear the macroeconomic risk.
"Macro hedging" is related to the possibility of capital insurance, as suggested by
Kashyap et al. (2008): When a bad shock occurs, the bank automatically receives capital
as an insurance payment, against a premium paid to a private or public insurance fund.9
The appeal of capital insurance is that it complies with Holmström’s precept of "fully
neutralizing" shocks that are not controlled by management.
Capital insurance can in a sense be interpreted as a "prefunded bailout". Such a
"bailout" is not a source of moral hazard provided that the insurance payment offset
solely the macroeconomic shock. To take an example, let us keep the assumption that
ε+ ε = 0 and assume that ε and ε are equiprobable. Consider now a contract where the
insurer makes a payment ε to the bank when ε = ε, and receives ε from the bank when
ε = ε. The bank will still be liquidated whenever π = π and s ≤ s∗, regardless of whether
the macroeconomic shock is favorable or unfavorable.
In our setting, the optimal policy can alternatively be implemented through a capital
insurance line or the use of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos).10 The trick for the
capital insurance implementation is to define maximum leverage D∗ as before and to have
the bank sign a capital insurance contract which ’neutralizes’ the macro shock represented
by ε and ε. Alternatively, one can introduce CoCos, such that a fraction is converted into
shares in a recession. This conversion wipes out an amount ∆ of debt D (> D∗) such
that:
π+ ε+ s∗

1+ α− 2D = 0
and:
π+ ε+ s∗

1+ α− 2(D− ∆) = 0.
Thus, capital insurance and CoCos look pretty similar in partial equilibrium.
3.5 Macroeconomic shock to prospects
We have so far assumed that the macroeconomic shock affects the short-term profit.
Alternatively, this shock could affect prospects. Suppose that the distribution of s is
conditioned by the macro shock ε (the cumulative distribution function, G(s |ε), is a
function of ε). Efficiency requires that the same cutoff s∗ be applied when short-term
9In Dewatripont and Tirole (1994b), we had a similar idea when we advocated procyclical deposit
insurance premia (with the insurer being then the public sector).
10CoCos are convertible bonds for which the conversion into shares is contingent on a specified, verifiable
event. We here take the contingency to be a macroeconomic event, although more generally CoCos may
be contingent on all kinds of verifiable events. See for example Bolton and Samama (2012) for a discussion
of various alternatives.
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profit is π, regardless of the realization of ε. Letting Pr (s ≤ s∗) ≡ Eε [Pr (s ≤ s
∗ |ε)], the
manager’s incentive constraint is still
Pr (s ≤ s∗)(p− p)B = Ψ.
The optimum can therefore be implemented through a maximum leverage D∗ given
by the familiar expression:
π+ s∗ (1+ α− 2D∗) = 0.
3.6 Summing up
The results of this section can be summarized as follows:
Result 3: Capital adequacy requirements can be rationalized as a way to achieve optimal
managerial discipline, at least in the absence of macroeconomic shocks. Neutralizing such
shocks in order to maintain optimal managerial discipline is at odds with Basel I or II: a
macroprudential approach is needed for optimal managerial discipline, and not solely to
avoid macroeconomic procyclicality.
Result 4: The key to optimality is to keep the incentives of both managers and share-
holders unaffected by the macroeconomic shock. This requires an automatic injection of
fresh capital in a recession: like Basel I/II, forbearance is suboptimal.
Result 5: When positive and negative shocks alternate deterministically, requiring
banks to build up capital in booms and allowing them to release it in recessions, as with
dynamic provisioning or with countercyclical capital buffers, is an appropriate solution.
Result 6: When macroeconomic shocks are random, requiring banks to subscribe to a
capital insurance scheme, or to issue CoCos, is an appropriate solution. While such a
scheme looks de facto like a prefunded bailout, it does not lead to moral hazard provided
that it is fully tied to exogenous macroeconomic shocks.
4 Towards a general equilibrium setting
While general equilibrium questions are very interesting, they lie beyond the scope of this
paper. Let us therefore content ourselves with a couple of remarks on this topic.
CoCos and capital insurance both "do the job" from the point of view of an efficient
bank governance. They differ, though, in the amount of cash that is supplied to the
bank from outside. With CoCos, a fraction of long-term debt is de facto written off,
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which restores shareholders’ incentives without external intervention. By contrast, capital
insurance brings direct cash to the bank.
Given that the shock is macroeconomic, a natural question for capital insurance is:
Who will supply the corresponding cash in case of a negative shock? The first possibility
is that the economy has enough stores of value that can be employed to this purpose.
However if there is a shortage of existing stores of value (to some extent, there must be,
otherwise hedging would be costless in our framework), these stores of value command a
premium, and insurance against macroeconomic shocks is limited. And in fact, the same
question arises concerning the use of CoCos. While CoCos do not require an injection of
external cash in a recession, the loss they incur from conversion during a recession is nec-
essarily priced out and therefore must reflect the shortage of cash in that macroeconomic
state.
A second way to address macro shocks is to have the state bring liquidity in bad states
of nature. Liquidity provision by public authorities in the case of macro shocks is then
useful for two reasons (Holmström-Tirole 1998, 2011): (i) their taxing powers give them
a unique access to the future income of consumers; and (ii) they can act ex post after
learning the state of nature, while private ex-ante investments in liquid assets are wasted
in the case of positive macro shocks. This argument, applied to the implementation of
optimal managerial incentive schemes through capital regulation, points at some superi-
ority of state-provided over privately-provided capital insurance (assuming away political
economy problems).
5 Conclusion
Our model departs from Modigliani-Miller in that the allocation of control rights to out-
side investors serves to discipline managers, and income rights of outside claims influence
investors’ exercise of their decision rights. It predicts that debt and (outside) equity can be
used to deliver efficient contingent control. Together with the representation hypothesis,
the model rationalizes typical capital-based banking regulation: after bad performance,
control shifts from equityholders to a debtholder representative unless equityholders re-
capitalize the bank.
Benchmarking actual regulation against the theoretical paradigm, we noted that Basel
I/II regulation fails to "control” for macro shocks: the regulations are too tough in reces-
sions and too lenient in booms. Forbearance ("ignoring" the recession by allowing lower
capital ratios) is also inadequate as it leads to gambling for resurrection. What is needed
is "real money" to control for the macro shock. In the case of positive and negative shocks
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that deterministically offset each other over time, dynamic provisioning or the Basel III
countercyclical capital buffer are appropriate ways to deal with these shocks. In the case
of random macro fluctuations, capital insurance or CoCos, both indexed on the macro
shocks, are appropriate.
We conclude with two alleys for future research. First, and as discussed in section 4,
a key issue with macroeconomic shocks is, in general equilibrium, that of the supply of
macro hedges. Second, a number of recent models have posited substantial benefits to
stores of value that are safe or nearly safe (e.g. Stein 2012, Gennaioli et al forthcoming); it
would be interesting to analyse implications of such an hypothesis for the cost of outside
equity or that of contingent instruments such as CoCos.
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